Description:This paper focuses on fisheries management systems as a motivation factor for market-oriented value adding (MOVA). Analytically, the paper relies on the marketing and industrial economics literature. It shows how established fisheries management systems reduce motivation for market-oriented value adding (MOVA) and thereby waste resource rent. An improved management model is introduced which motivates MOVA, cost-efficiency, sustainability, and fair social allocation. This model combines a Seasonal Quota Auction (SQA) and administrative allocation of licenses and quotas to communities or fisher groups. This model offers the following advantages in comparison with a pure Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) model: (i) increases resource rent without privatizing the fish resources to a few private holders; (ii) leases seasonal quotas instead of selling permanent quotas as with ITQ; (iii) improves rent generation by motivating the most market-oriented and efficient fishers by leasing quotas on credit; and (iv) offers the choice of collecting resource rent through fisher's cooperatives, regions, ITQ owners, government, or redistribution of rent as a bonus to all fishers.