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Type: Journal Article
Journal title: Western Journal of Agricultural Economics>Volume 14, Number 01, July 1989
Year of publication: 1989
Source:
AgEcon
Collected from:
AGRIS
Subject:
cooperatives
Description:
Little progress has been made in testing the often conflicting hypotheses generated from theoretical research on cooperatives. This paper addresses the deficiency by describing and applying (to California cotton ginning cooperatives) a methodology to test key hypotheses concerning (a) cooperatives price-output equilibrium, (b) allocative efficiency, and (c) utilization of capital inputs. The empirical results (a) are consistent with predictions from the game theory model of cooperative behavior, (b) reject the null hypothesis of absolute allocative efficiency, and (c) indicate absolute overutilization of capital inputs among the sample cooperatives.
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Incentives to Efficient Investment Decisions in Agricultural CooperativesRecent studies have questioned the competitiveness of agricultural cooperatives in an industrialized food system, based on empirical results and economic theory. New organizational institutions have been proposed to overcome the cooperative main weaknesses (the so called new generation cooperatives). In this paper, we provide a simple model based on a financial approach to address the issue of cooperative competitiveness and to assess the investment efficiency of both traditional and new generation cooperatives. The main conclusions of the analysis are: i) cooperatives (both traditional and new generation ones) may have incentive to adopt projects that do not maximize the Net Present Value of the firm ii) the institutions of new generation cooperatives are not sufficient to ensure net present value maximization, even though they address some of the main concerns of traditional cooperatives iii) traditional cooperatives may have a competitive advantage in businesses that require the aggregation of a large number of farmers. Provider: Subject: cooperatives agribusiness and cooperatives Collected from: |
AGRERI Library
New producer strategies: the emergence of patron-driven entrepreneurshipProvider: Subject: cooperatives agribusiness and cooperatives |
Farmers' Cooperatives in the EU: Policies, Strategies, and OrganizationProvider: Subject: policies agricultural policies cooperatives agribusiness and cooperatives |
External Library
Incentives to Efficient Investment Decisions in Agricultural CooperativesRecent studies have questioned the competitiveness of agricultural cooperatives in an industrialized food system, based on empirical results and economic theory. New organizational institutions have been proposed to overcome the cooperative main weaknesses (the so called new generation cooperatives). In this paper, we provide a simple model based on a financial approach to address the issue of cooperative competitiveness and to assess the investment efficiency of both traditional and new generation cooperatives. The main conclusions of the analysis are: i) cooperatives (both traditional and new generation ones) may have incentive to adopt projects that do not maximize the Net Present Value of the firm ii) the institutions of new generation cooperatives are not sufficient to ensure net present value maximization, even though they address some of the main concerns of traditional cooperatives iii) traditional cooperatives may have a competitive advantage in businesses that require the aggregation of a large number of farmers. Provider: Subject: cooperatives agribusiness and cooperatives Collected from: |
