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Twenty-one papers explore the accomplishments, limitations, and unmet needs of the field of new institutional economics. Papers discuss the theories of the firm; contracts--from bilateral sets of incentives to the multilevel governance of relations; institutions and the institutional environment; human nature and institutional analysis; the "case" for case studies in new institutional economics; new institutional econometrics--the case of research on contracting and organization; experimental methodology to inform new institutional economics issues; game theory and institutions; new institutional economics, organization, and strategy; interfirm alliances--a new institutional economics approach; governance structure and contractual design in retail chains; make-or-buy decisions--a new institutional economics approach; transaction costs, property rights, and the tools of the new institutional economics--water rights and water markets; contracting and organization in food and agriculture; buying, lobbying, or suing--interest groups' participation in policy making--a selective survey; regulation and deregulation in network industry; constitutional political economy--analyzing formal institutions at the most elementary level; new institutional economics and its application on transition and developing economies; law and economics in retrospect; the theory of the firm and its critics--a stocktaking and assessment; and the causes of institutional inefficiency--a development perspective. Brousseau is Professor of Economics at the University of Paris X and Director of EconomiX. Glachant is Professor of Economics and Head of the Electricity Reforms Group in the ADIS Research Center at the University of Paris-Sud XI. Index.
Cooperatives have a difficult problem in acquiring equity capital because the residual claimant (benefactor) is the patron of the firm, not the investor. This leads to cooperative investment problems described in this paper: a) the free rider problem, b) the horizon problem, and c) the portfolio problem. Empirical analysis utilizing a latent variable structural equation model and a large dual response survey suggests that member-patrons are more likely to invest in cooperatives which adopt well defined property rights policies and structures than traditional cooperatives characterized by ill-defined property right structures.
Following European Directive 2003/30/EC, the Greek Government adapted legislation that introduces and regulates the bio diesel market. The implemented quota scheme allocates the country’s annual, predetermined, tax exempt production of bio diesel to industries based on their ability to meet several criteria. A number of bio diesel supply chain stakeholders have criticized this policy for being efficiency-robbing and vague. This paper uses 2007 data from energy crop farms and three bio diesel producing companies in order to assess these criticisms. We study the economic and environmental aspects of the currently adopted policy and compare them to three alternative scenarios. We conclude that such criticisms have a merit and that policy makers need to reconsider their alternative options regarding the promotion of bio diesel in transport. Permission of sales directly to local consumers and promotion of forward integration by farmers are efficiency enhancing and environmentally friendly means of promoting the use of bio diesel in transport.
Agricultural cooperatives have changed considerably in recent decades. In witnessing these structural changes, scholars have proffered analyses of nontraditional ownership models focusing on residual claim rights. However, crucial information on the allocation of control rights in cooperatives is missing. This study sheds light on alternative ownership-control models adopted by agricultural cooperatives in different regions across the world. In each of these models, we describe the allocation of formal control rights with a focus on decision management and decision control rights. We thus provide empirical evidence on the “separation of ownership and control” in agricultural cooperatives. We also analyze each of the governance models in terms of the associated ownership costs, including risk-bearing costs, the costs of controlling managers, and collective decision-making costs. In doing so, we are able to better understand the forces influencing the organizational efficiency of each cooperative model. [EconLit classification: Q130].